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   It is a pleasure for us all to be asked to participate in this historic international 
conference on Japan Studies. It is historic precisely because it is international. Until our 
generation, Japan studies has been the preserve of Japanese scholars, and carried out in 
Japanese and in relative isolation. Japan has studied the rest of the world, but until recently 
that world studied Japan very little. 
   Japan today makes every effort to encourage that study, and our conference is made 
possible by the generous upport of its new organizations. But that generosity would make 
little difference without a new awareness throughout the world that Japanese culture and 
civilization deserve and indeed demand serious attention as an important part of the world's 
cultural heritage. Japan's new international nd economic mportance does help to bring that 
to the world's attention, but it would matter very little without the deeper awareness of the 
content and quality of the Japanese xperience. And so today, in most parts of the world, 
Japan studies has become a recognized field of scholarship. Japan is finally becoming an 
exporter of culture as well as goods, and if the report of the Advisory Committee established 
by Prime Minister Hosokawa in October 1993 finds a hearing our activities mark an early 
point, and not the culmination, of such activities. 
   Until very recently Japan has interested the rest of the world, particularly the developing 
world, as a source of technology, and of applied modernization, but not of culture. Those of us 
who come from the United States can appreciate that, for the American and the Japanese roles 
have in many ways been strangely similar. Each country was seen as derivative of other 
civilizations. The Western world began its acquaintance with China's ancient civilization and 
cultural values as a result of the Jesuit missions to China, but, partly because Japan expelled 
those same Jesuits, Japan's cultural classics had to wait until the nineteenth century for 
translation i to Western languages, and then usually by amateur scholars. Japan did its best 
to restrict what Dutch merchants could learn of its culture, so that serious tudy had to wait 
until the nineteenth century. And so it is not surprising that the idea developed that Japan's 
was largely a deviant form of Chinese civilization. Japan's most important cultural neighbors, 
the Chinese, were usually happy to agree. Study of Japan could be useful for what it told 
about he application ofWestern institutions and technology, but not really for what it told 
about Japan itself. Japan in fact seemed curiously old-fashioned to one Chinese student who 
came in 1903 and found himself sitting on the floor as though e had returned to the T'ang 
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Dynasty. "Here we had crossed the seas and gone abroad to study in order to prepare for a 
future restoration", he wrote, "yet once in Japan the first thing we had to do was go back to 
antiquity." 
   Of course the United States too was seen as entirely derivative of its European origins, 
remarkable for its resources and its burgeoning technology, but not a source of culture on its 
own. Japan was at least old, and indigenous. Moreover it valued its own tradition, even in the 
process of modernization. Its new universities developed programs of history and literature, 
kokushi and kokubun from the first. In the United States programs in American civilization for 
the most part had to wait until the expansion of univesity curricula in postwar decades. 
   All this had a direct impact on the study of America in Japan, just as it did on the study 
of Japan in America. American studies in Japan had to develop in the shadow of English 
literature and Western history, and they experienced a slow and difficult growth even in 
postwar years despite support from the United States. So too with Japanese studies in the 
Untied States. Until World War II the progress of East Asian, or Far Eastern, studies was 
predominantly under the direction of specialists in Chinese studies who valued Japanese 
chiefly as an ancillary tool for the understanding of China. Not until the post war period, 
which produced the first cohort of American specialists on Japan, did this begin to change. 
   But of course there are other things that set Japan off from the Western, especially 
American, experience and that help to account for the slow growth of Japan studies in the 
non-Japanese world. The first is surely the isolating effect of Japan's language. And the 
second is the nature of Japan's self-imposed isolation during early modern times. It is the 
experience and consciousness of that isolation that I propose to discuss this afternoon. 
   We are all familiar with Watsuji Tetsuro's argument that sakoku was responsible for most 
of the problems that Japan experienced in modern times, that it made necessary a rush 
modernization under state control, and contributed to the consequent drive to compete and 
excel with its disastrous results in the Pacific War. 
   In the Meiji Period, Western scholarly fashions helped to focus attention on sakoku. 
Professor Leonard Blusse of Leiden has pointed out that German historical scholarship in 
history, taking its lead from Leopold von Ranke, concentrated on the importance of 
international relations to the development of the modern state, and that this helped to confirm 
Japanese preoccupation with seclusion and isolation. Meiji Japanese cultural and political 
history, eager to fit Japan into Western paradigms, constructed a scholarly and intellectual 
counterpart to the political desire to follow in the path of the West. The same Fukuzawa who 
showed such heavy dependence on Buckle and Guizot for his Bummei ron no gairyaku coined 
the phrase datsu-a nyu o. For him and his generation the Edo period represented something to 
avoid in constructing the new Japan. 
   For our generation, however, Edo looks quite different. We have not, of course, been 
frustrated by its cruelties, restrictions, and conservatism the way the Meiji pioneers were. A 
longer perspective makes it possible to see how different things were at different periods in 
Edo. More particularly, the disasters that dominated Watsuji's consciousness are now a half 
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century behind us. The system that seemed moribund to young Fukuzawa looks more and 
more interesting to Haga Toru, whose recent Bummei to shite no Tokugawa Nihon offers a fine 
illustration of these points. His colleague Kamigaito Kenichi's 'Sakoku' no hikaku bummeiron 
gives a quite different estimate of the matter from Watsuji's. 
   Even more striking for me was a recent zadankai in which Professors Haga and Yamazaki 
Masakazu seemed inclined to think rather well of the whole system of seclusion of Edo times. 
They saw the system as a normal, or at least reasonable, response of an early modern state 
that was defining itself and its boundaries. The system saved Japan from possible Catholic 
conquest, and it did not really choke off intellectual curiosity and variety. In fact, Professor 
Yamazaki is quoted as saying that "the country was far more open to new currents during the 
sakoku period than it is now... both foreign goods and information flowed in abundantly." So 
poor old Watsuji! And even more, poor old Perry! He might as well have stayed home. 
   It is in this context that I have been thinking about, and propose to talk today about, 
"Japan and Its World". 
   Let me begin with a reminder that the borders of the bakuhan state of Edo times were 
unclear; in fact, they were deliberately fuzzy. My colleague David Howell has recently 
analyzed the border to the north. Southern Hokkaido was clearly part of the Tokugawa state. 
The Ainu, defeated in the Shakushain War in 1672, were reduced to economic dependency in 
a constricted homeland. But they were not allowed or encouraged to become Japanese. The 
function and legitimacy of the Matsumae domain depended upon its interaction with the "non-
Japanese" Ainu and control over them. They performed a ritual audience with the Matsumae 
daimyo, the uinam, once a year. This was depicted as an ancient ceremony, but it was really 
constructed in Tokugawa times, and first performed for shogunal inspectors in the early 
seventeenth century. Mogami Tokunai wrote that on these occasions the Ainu involved were 
discouraged from speaking Japanese, or dressing like Japanese. Presumably it would have 
invalidated the Matsumae function for them to do so.2 
   Something similar was going on in the south. In its dealings with Ryukyu, which it seized 
in 1609, the domain of Satsuma pretended that it was intermediary with a more or less 
independent country. This had commercial advantages, of course, since it enabled it to trade 
with China, but the elaborate charade that was arranged for Chinese missions to Ryukyu and 
for Ryukyu missions to Japan also emphasized the fact of its integrity as a non-Japanese 
border zone. 
   Trade and contact with Korea was more important still, and provided the legitimacy 
and the income for the domain of Tsushima. Professor Tashiro Kazui shows how important 
the Korean trade was. It frequently brought more goods than Nagasaki did, and special 
exemptions from the ban on exports of silver were made to keep it going. As many as one 
thousand Japanese resided at the wakan, or Japanese trading area in Pusan. There were twelve 
major Korean missions, the tsushinshi, nine of which came to offer congratulations on the 
investment of a new shogun, that helped to show daimyo and commoners alike that, as 
Professor Toby puts it, the bakufu was an important regional power. These were large 
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missions; they involved three to five hundred people, and they were paraded to Edo, and often 
on to Nikko. Studies of Amenomori Hoshu by Professor Kamigaito and Tjoa Miao-ling at 
Leiden show that the Koreans took these missions very seriously. The diary of a member of 
the mission of 1764 describes his audience with the Korean king, who interviewed several 
candidates and had them compose lines of Chinese poetry within a fixed time as though they 
were exchanging, and competing, with their Japanese hosts. Cultural credentials were as 
important as diplomatic credentials. 
   In each of these cases it was essential to emphasize particularity and keep the outsiders 
from getting too close to the Japanese. We see this .also with the Dutch at Nagasaki, where it 
was probably easier. Examination of the marginalia to the Deshima Diaries (Deshima nikki), 
which are now being published at Leiden University, shows a number of cases in which Dutch 
representatives of the East India Company were told to leave Japan because their Japanese 
was becoming too good. The Edo regime had no interest in tolerating what are more recently 
called hen na gaijin. 
   In contrast to this, of course, it was Japanese who were supposed to learn how to deal 
with the Ainu, with Ryukyu, with Korea, and with the Dutch. By the time Isaac Titsingh, 
whose correspondence is now being published, headed the Deshima station in the eighteenth 
century, we find a number of exchanges between him and daimyo after he left Japan but 
they are in Dutch, and not in Japanese. Some Japanese, like Amenomori Hoshu, extended 
themselves in the study of Korean while in residence at the Japanese station at Pusan. He 
apparently mastered not only standard Korean but regional dialects as well, and he compiled a 
sort of textbook of Korean. No wonder his name was revived in honor in connection with the 
visit of President Roh of Korea to Japan a few years ago. But I doubt that anybody in Edo 
times thought of helping the Koreans to learn Japanese. 
   In any event, the borders of Japan faded off at each point; Matsumae, Satsuma, and 
Tsushima were contact points with the non-Japanese world. But what was the nature of sakoku, 
and what view did it permit of that non-Japanese world? I would like to make two main 
points. The first is that the sakoku system was very far from static and unchanging. The 
second is that most Japanese and Western scholarship has focused on its application to the 
West and paid too little emphasis to trade and cultural relations with Korea and China. 
   Bakufu leaders credited most of their acts to the example and inspiration of Tokugawa 
Ieyasu, but he cannot really be blamed for seclusion. On the contrary, he did his best to 
reopen trade with Korea, he thought about formal relations with China, and he would have 
welcomed trade with Catholic Europe so long as it did not include Catholic missionaries. The 
problem, as Professor Kamigaito points out, was that it couldn't be done. The state diplomatic 
documents show that this was the case. Letters from the Spanish spoke of religion and said 
little or nothing about trade. The English king identified himself as "defender of the faith", 
but he did speak of commerce. Consequently the English in 1613 were given permission to 
come to "any port"; their efforts thereafter form the subject matter of Professor Derek 
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Massarella's recent book.3 On the other hand the Dutch, who arrived at Hirado in 1609, spoke 
only of trade and said nothing about Christianity. Not only that. Mauritz of Nassau wrote in 
1610 confirming Japan's worst fears of Catholic imperialism. "The Society of Jesus", he 
warned, "under cover of the sanctity of religion, intends to convert the Japanese to its 
religion, split the kingdom of Japan, and lead the country to civil war." By implication: let us 
do your trading for you, for we can provide whatever it is you need, without incurring the 
danger of missionaries. To emphasize the point the Dutch sent useful gifts like lead and 
gunpowder, instead of playthings for the rich and aristocratic. It was not difficult to predict 
Ieyasu's preference between these overtures; a message sent to Spanish authorities in the 
Philippines warned that Japan had been a Divine Country from ages past, and that the shogun 
was not about to reverse the stand of earlier generations. 
   Ieyasu also tried hard to heal the broken relationship with East Asia, especially Korea. 
He had to be conscious of the enormous cost of the Korean disaster in lives and treasure. In 
any case he did his best to work out the Treaty of Kiyu in 1609 that reopened trade through 
Tsushima and the wakan at Pusan. The Koreans were understandably wary about reopening 
contact, of course, and specified that no Japanese were to go beyond the Pusan settlement, 
and certainly not as far as Seoul. 
   In China Ming authorities were less forgiving, and showed little interest in Japanese 
overtures for a resumption of direct trade. They argued that Japanese pirates were not to be 
trusted under any conditions. What doubt remained for them must have been resolved by the 
Satsuma invasion of Ryukyu in 1609. This produced memorials to the Ming throne warning 
of the new danger. Since in addition the Chinese merchants most anxious to go to Japan were 
from southern China, an area farthest from Peking, it is not surprising that memorialists also 
argued for laws against the construction of ships large enough to sail to Japan. 
   As seen from Edo, then, East Asia was not a very friendly place. The Portuguese 
presence at Macao suggested a Portuguese tieup with the Ming. The Ming maintained a ban 
on commerce with Japan. The Koreans restricted Japanese to a slightly enlarged version of 
Deshima. One would not expect future shoguns to persevere in the idea of open relations with 
a number of countries. One might even argue that, with precedents like those mentioned, 
Japan's was not the first, but in a way the last, sakoku policy in East Asia. 
   But it was much more effective than the others. In the 1630s a ruthless and paranoid 
shogun, lemitsu, responded to domestic insurrection at Shimabara. He was also aware of 
instability in the East Asian world order. Ming China and Korea were struggling with 
Manchu invaders. The picture in Europe also seemed confused. The long war of 
independence between Holland and Spain came to an end in 1648, and this left room for 
doubt about even friendly foreigners. Nor did word from Europe encourage ideas of freedom 
of religion. In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia resolved the Protestant-Catholic standoff with a 
Latin formula that called for the acceptance of the ruler's faith by those under his governance: 
cuius regio, eius religio, as the treaty phrased it, left no room for individual decision. 
   What was special about the Japanese version of this was the ferocity of the persecution of 
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kirishitan. For that we probably have the character of Iemitsu to consider, together with the 
way inquisitors like Inoue, Chikugo no kami Masashige, were able to prey upon the depraved 
tastes of a cruel and jealous despot. Reinier Hesselink's study of the Bresken affair, which 
deserves early publication, provides abundant details of this, as does George Elison's earlier 
discussion in Deus Destroyed.4 
   The bakufu's obsession with domestic control was reinforced by its knowledge of the 
changes in Asia. It seemed wise to cut off Japanese traders from sources of contamination in 
East Asia, and finally to make them stay home altogether. Even "Chinese" ships from those 
areas were less welcome. Professor Kamiya Nobuyuki of Kyushu University discerns a 
"Macao-Luzon" line beyond which bakufu authorities tried to cut off all the trading relations 
the shuin-sen had carried on earlier. With the Manchu victory in China, however, intelligence 
gathered beyond that point also became less satisfactory, and after the Manchu government 
restricted trade to Canton in 1757 Japan's view of even East Asia gradually became narrower. 
   Despite this, fears of the outside world gradually lessened, and what seemed bizarre 
began to seem interesting. Interest in the West and its medical knowledge increased. In 1691 
and 1692, just three centuries ago, Kaempfer found himself treated like someone from another 
planet, but by the time of Yoshimune a few decades later restrictions on the import of books 
were eased. Symbolically, Yoshimune ordered the bamboo blinds that had shielded his 
predecessors from the Dutch to be thrown open so that he could face them directly. By 1745 
the Dutch diary notes that "Europeans have never been so close to the shogun" after they had 
been asked to write words in Dutch and slide them directly toward him. By then also, the 
diary notes that on the visit to Edo "all day long physicians and students visited us." 
   And then in the final stage of the sakoku system fears of outside danger brought new 
vigilance and caution. Even China, where Manchu imperialism had extended the historic 
borders of China, began to look dangerous. Hayashi Shihei warned of possible danger there. It 
was especially the Russian advance to the north, and knowledge of the revolutionary and then 
Napoleonic disorder in Western Europe, that combined to encourage a new fear of the outside 
world. Specialists in Western knowledge were now coopted by the government, and private 
investigation became more dangerous. In 1825, at the recommendation of Takahashi 
Kageyasu, the famous "don't think twice", ni nen naku, order for instant repulsion of Western 
ships, signalled a new paranoia. Professor Mitani Hiroshi's recent studies in the formation of 
bakufu policy in the 1840s show how hard it was to move away from this position. 
   The seclusion system, then, changed over time with perceptions of the international 
order. Despite the protestations of nineteenth century leaders that they were following 
tradition, seclusion was not central to Ieyasu's thought, nor was it particularly bizarre in the 
seventeenth century of state building and religious intolerance. It changed over time with 
Japanese perceptions of utility and international affairs, and it became rigid and self-defeating 
only at the end as the bakufu struggled with itself.
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   But more important than this is the fact that sakoku was aimed principally at the West. It 
is Western ethnocentricism to think of a country that has chosen to cut itself off from 
Westerners as though it was off from the world. Where Asia was concerned, the seclusion 
rules were much more a bamboo fence than they were a Berlin wall. 
   Bakufu trade policies were directed toward the acquisition of Chinese goods, and in this 
regard they were highly successful. Foreign trade and the Nagasaki system were so important 
to the bakufu that it subsidized domains that produced copper for export in order to keep them 
going. The "Dutch" trade was actually trade in Asian, chiefly Chinese, goods. And Chinese 
and Koreans brought more than the Dutch did. The Nagasaki trade, as Professor Oba Osamu 
has put it, was really China trade. 
   The Chinese had no headman and no formal authorization as the Dutch did, and they too 
experienced a gradual narrowing of freedom of movement, but they were far more numerous. 
The Chinese quarter in Nagasaki, the tojin yashiki that was established in 1689, constituted an 
area that harbored thousands of people when the fleet was in; in its first year it housed 4,888 
Chinese. This was in contrast to the modest Dutch presence on Deshima. The quarter 
occupied an area somewhat larger than seven acres, double that of Deshima. Both areas were 
surrounded by water. Deshima was an artificial island, the tojin yashiki was surrounded by a 
moat. In the 1740s, when things were going badly for the Dutch, Deshima was patrolled by 
over 30 Japanese guards; the Chinese quarter was more closely administered by over three 
hundred officials, guards, and inspectors. Things were on a dramatically different scale, and 
the allocations for ships, and for export limits of copper, also bear this out. 
   It is the cultural role of the Chinese, at least prior to the development of rangaku, that 
provides the most striking contrast to that of the Dutch. We are all familiar with Kaempfer's 
famous account of the way he and his companions were obliged to humiliate themselves for 
several hours of silly pantomine to amuse the shogun. But Tsunayoshi, that same shogun, 
tried hard to be a serious student of the higher culture of China. He laughed at Kaempfer, but 
he treated visiting Chinese monks with the greatest deference. The Dutch were well-advised 
to keep their faith under wraps, and they sealed whatever religious books they brought with 
them while their vessels were in port, but the Chinese were permitted to build branches of 
their temples in Fukien and Chekiang. Three were established before the seclusion decrees, 
one to provide for the needs of provincials from Chekiang, Kiansu and Kiangsi; two more 
were for sailors from Fukien, Foochow, and Changchow-Ch'uanchow. In 1678 a fourth temple 
was established for men from Canton (Kwangchow). Priests and abbots came from China for a 
century and more to staff these temples. The "Nanking" temple served as the avenue of 
introduction for Chinese monks who moved on to central Japan to found the Obaku Rinzai 
temple of Mampukuji at Uji. The first abbot was Yin Yun (Ingen), who brought a revised 
ordination procedure. He was soon in touch with the Myoshinji abbot Ryokei; he was invited 
to Kyoto for an audience with the retired emperor Go Mizunoo, and he enjoyed the patronage 
of Tokugawa letsuna. Until 1740 all Mampukuji abbots were from China; then they alternated 
with Japanese abbots for sixty years, and only after that were they all Japanese.
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   Ironically, though, it was Kaempfer, and Titsing and von Siebold after him, who 
managed, despite the restrictions under which they lived, to scrape together the information 
on life in Edo Japan that still serves to educate us; so far as I am aware the Chinese guests, 
with much better opportunities, did nothing of the sort. What would we give for Ingen's 
picture of the conversations, seminars, and banquets with his Japanese hosts! 
   Ingen and other Chinese Rinzai monks were honored guests at the court of Tsunayoshi. 
Tsunayoshi prided himself on his knowledge of the Chinese classics. He presided at some 240 
seminars on the I Ching, and monks, officials, daimyo, and Confucian scholars were expected 
to be present. Tsunayoshi's chamberlain Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu organized groups for the 
study of spoken Chinese, and the court Confucianist Ogyu Sorai went to great effort to try to 
master spoken colloquial Chinese. Sorai's letters to these learned Chinese are full of almost 
cloying respect and flattery. In short, the contrast between the treatment of these Chinese 
prelates and the dragnet that was out for Catholic priests brings home the fact that although 
for a century and more the seclusion system tried to exclude Western thought and religion, 
during the same period the Japanese elite was struggling to master the Chinese cultural 
tradition. That same respect was extended to Chinese goods. The bakufu saw to it that the 
best of Chinese silks came into its own hands and that the best of Chinese books were 
available to its scholars. 
   Some of this same priority extended to Korean scholars, partly because they could help in 
the transmission of Chinese goods and thought. Amenomori Hoshu struggled to master 
Korean, but before that he went to Nagasaki to study spoken Chinese. Members oof Korean 
missions to Japan exchanged more than poems, paintings, and calligraphy with their hosts. 
Japanese were keen to learn more of medicine as practiced by the Koreans. In response to this 
it became customary to include doctors with each mission, and question and answer sessions 
with the visiting physicians were held along their route of travel. The Korean trade was a 
principal source of silk thread. Korean potters brought knowledge of the clays and glazes that 
made possible Japanese production of the blue slipware porcelain pattern that frequently was 
known as "Chinese grass" - karakusa. Before long this ware made its way via the port of 
Imari to Deshima for transmission to Europe, and from there on to Delft, to Meissen, and to 
Worcester, where the kilns began to domesticate its glazes and sometimes its patterns. In 
some respects, in other words, "closed" Japan was a transmission point for international 
cultural and technological exchange. William Atwell's analysis of bullion flows has shown 
that same Japan was a major player in economic exchange as well. 
   In the time of the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, the study of Chinese precedents extended to 
institutional patterns, with the study of Ming administrative law and the import of the Six 
Maxims of Shun-chih, the first Manchu emperor. Interestingly enough, it had been forwarded 
from Ryukyu by Satsuma. Yoshimune saw that its political moralisms could have direct 
application to Japan. He ordered a simplified translation of a popular text containing the 
maxims for use in lower schools. There are records of daimyo who ordered village leaders to 
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explain its importance on the first day of every month, and the inspiration for such an 
imperial statement of civic morality took firm root. Its influence can be seen in the Meiji 
Period's equivalent, the Imperial Rescript on Education.5 
   The contact with China was large enough to have room for popular culture as well as 
high culture. We have the names of about 130 Chinese painters who came and stayed for a 
time. They were not the great artists of their day, of course; most of them were priests and 
merchants who were sufficiently skillful to make Japanese admire their work. Several of these 
men enjoyed enormous fame in Japan. Shen Nan-p'in, the best known, came in 1731 and again 
in 1733. Afer his return he continued to export his work to Japan, where about two hundred of 
his paintings survive. He and three others were known as the "four great teachers" who 
introduced late Ming and early Ch'ing styles of birds and flower painting. Theirs was a 
pleasant, bourgeoise style that was easy to live with. It was popular with the urban residents 
of central China, and it quickly became popular with the townsmen in Japan. They also 
introduced Chinese "literati" painting, which found echo in Japanese bunjinga styles of Buson, 
Ike no Taiga, and late Tokugawa eclectics. 
   The shogun's interest extended to highly practical imports from China, in the hope of 
reducing what was becoming a serious trade imbalance. As Japanese mines ran out, 
restrictions were put on the export of bullion in 1685 and again in 1715 and at the end of the 
century. Both Dutch and Chinese were now sharply limited in the number of ships and copper 
they could export. New measures to control smuggling came into effect, and the inspection of 
books from China, instituted much earlier, grew in importance. But works of practical benefit 
increased in number, for the bakufu was now eager to produce things like sugar, silk, and 
pharmacology in Japan, items that had figured high on the list of imports. This brought with it 
the hiring of specialists from China to help in the search for comparable plants and soils in 
Japan. For some time, in other words, the cultural impact of the Chinese tradition continued 
to grow and spread throughout Japanese society despite the slackening of trade. 
   One sees other changes in Japan's international trade. As Japanese need for and interest 
in raw materials for war - gun powder, saltpeter - diminished the Dutch found themselves 
sending different kinds of goods to Nagasaki. Sugar was high among these, and it was one of 
the items whose domestic production Yoshimune tried to encourage. When the supply 
available to the Dutch dried up because of the destruction of sugar refining facilities in Java 
after a Chinese insurrection there in the eighteenth century, it endangered the arrangement 
with Deshima; the bakufu administrators provided less copper, and the Dutch threatened to 
break things off altogether. Significantly, they now knew they had the inhabitants of Nagasaki 
on their side, as the city lived for and on foreign trade. So did the men fortunate enough to be 
appointed to deal with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki, for they were able to enhance their 
income many times through quiet peculation. 
   What needs to be stressed is that it was the Dutch, and not the Japanese, who threatened 
to break off trade. For the bakufu it had become an essential part of the system. As early as 
the 1690s Kaempfer had noted that Japan could get along without the system perfectly well, 
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but valued the information on world affairs that was contained in the reports that ship 
captains were required to submit. The fusetsugaki might not always be accurate or adequate, 
but they were the regime's only avenue to information of that sort. By the second half of the 
eighteenth century, however, the diminishing production of copper posed problems for 
keeping things going. It is fascinating to see that copper producing domains like Akita were 
able to get bakufu subsidies to help them make up their quota of export copper, and that the 
bakufu did its best to prevent diversion of the dwindling supply to the internal market, where 
it could bring higher prices than it did in the fixed exchange at Nagasaki. "Import 
substitution", in the form of encouragement of domestic production to reduce imports, 
"managed trade" through price control, emphasizing outside markets at the expense of the 
domestic market, and "trade disputes" with the Dutch, are clearly not new phenomena in 
Japan. They have a considerable history. 
   The interesting thing is that there seems to have been very little connection, indeed an 
almost inverse relationship, between the volume and importance of trade and the cultural 
impact of outside civilizations. Trade with both China and Holland enjoyed its highest 
volume in the seventeenth century, and although the China cultural impact coincided with 
that, it continued to grow in the eighteenth century with literacy, education, and peace. When 
the Dutch trade was at its peak the Dutch East India Company representatives were treated 
like bizarre apparitions on their sampu trips to Edo. But as ships of goods became less 
important, shipment of books became more important. Perhaps I sound like an academic eager 
to deprecate commerce. Whatever the case, the Deshima Diary for the 1740s and '50s has 
some interesting contrasts between the dreary standoff in arguments about copper, sugar and 
prices and the perceptible growth of interest in Dutch medicine and technology. 
    It began with Yoshimune's interest in the improvement of products, but for the most part 
it reflected a much wider interest in Western medicine, one that kept the Hollanders 
answering questions while they were in Edo. Before another century had passed elements of 
Dutch medicine were a standard part of the remedies advocated by even rural doctors, as 
Professor Tazaki Tetsuro has shown. Western medicine did not, of course, grow in isolated 
specialization, but rather in combination with earlier and Chinese teachings. In that sense 
Professor Yamazaki Masakazu's comment about the entry of new information and ideas, with 
which I began, finds jusification. 
    This same pattern of eclecticism extended widely through Japanese culture. In painting, 
one finds an overlay of Western ideas of perspective and technique on earlier patterns. The 
best example. though somewhat extreme, is furnished by Shiba Kokan. He began by using a 
Chinese pen name and doing birds and flowers in the Chinese manner, then modeled himself 
on Harunobu's prints of urban scenes and beauties, and finally moved on to Dutch painting 
and copper plate engraving and travelled to Nagasaki to see what he could learn. By the time 
he died in 1818, in other words, many Japanese were reorienting, or certainly broadening, 
themselves. Perhaps we can let Hirata Atsutane sum this up, with his statement in Kodo tall' 
that "Japanese should study all the different kinds of learning - even though they may be
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foreign so that they can choose the good features of each and place them at the service of 
the country." 
   These are familiar, but fascinating perspectives from which to consider the nature of the 
Japanese world view in early modern times. It is clear that during Edo years there were 
dramatic changes in Japan's world, as there were dramatic changes in Japan itself. The long 
interval of peace in Japan contrasted with an almost unbroken series of wars in the West. In 
the process dramatic changes in military technology made the weapons Japanese used as 
obsolete as the class structure of the people using them. Intellectual, political and economic 
transformation in America and Europe led to the participatory state with its citizen soldiers, 
while in Japan ordinary people took little interest in the activities of samurai. When English 
sailors landed at Shimonoseki in 1863 to spike the guns that had shelled them, local farmers 
obligingly lent them a hand, and at the seige of Wakamatsu in the Boshin War enterprising 
entrepreneurs were on hand to sell fruits to both sides during lulls in the shooting. In contrast, 
the explosion of national energy of revolutionary France led to the large scale slaughter of 
the Napoleonic wars. 
   The relative standing of the powers also changed dramatically. At the start of the 
Tokugawa period Holland was becoming one of Europe's great powers, with stations in all 
parts of the world, but by the time of Japan's opening it had been transformed into a small 
trading state which minded its own business almost as quietly as Tokugawa Japan did. 
Japanese students sent to Holland in the 1860s concluded with dismay that they had been 
studying the wrong Western language. Matsuki Koan, the future Terashima Munenori, spoke 
for them in a letter home in 1862. "Many scholars in England and France raised their 
eyebrows when they heard that we read Dutch books", he said; "even the Hollanders 
themselves all read their books in French or German... Beyond the borders there is literally 
no one who knows Dutch. I must honestly say that the country is so small and mean as to 
startle one. . . beside that, the factories are extremely small. .116 He might, of course, have said 
the same things about Japan. 
   Perceptions of China underwent comparably drastic change. While Japan was turned 
inward the Manchu emperors had embarked upon a program of imperial expansion that 
brought China its present borders in the northeast, west, and southwest. We sense echoes of 
this in Hayashi Shihei's alarm at the military muscle displayed by the great Manchu emperors. 
But by the early nineteenth century that perception had changed once more as a new and 
stronger England prepared its challenge. Sato Nobuhiro argued that a resurgent Japan might 
begin its rise by seizing the Manchu homeland in the north, and by bakumatsu times each 
Japanese mission that stopped at Chinese ports on its way home brought new stories of 
Chinese weakness and inefficiency. After the Western powers destroyed the Chinese 
international system, Japan's echo of that, with tributary races to the north and south, no 
longer made much sense. 
   As I noted earlier, there had been indications in the late eighteenth century - the 
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Tanuma years that Japan might relax its restrictions and experiment with some new forms 
of international trade. If this had been done, Japan might not have found itself so seriously 
"behind" the West. In the 1870s the Iwakura ambassadors noted that, as Kume Kunitake put it 
in his chronicle of that great mission, the technological superiority of the West was of recent 
date. Moreover, it seemed to him that what really counted was the need for enterprise and 
drive, which could make up for natural disadvantages. By then China was no longer a model, 
but Holland still had something to say for itself. As he put it, "If people with the minds of the 
Dutch lived in the lands of China, one knows that hundreds of Hollands would be produced in 
the East. When we think about it, cannot the industrious efforts of Holland be compared to 
those of Japan?".7 
   There are other things to note about the reception Japanese missions received in the 
nineteenth century. The Western leaders they met were critical of Japan's ban on Christianity, 
but in Protestant countries many were quick to agree that there might have been a problem 
about Catholics in early modern times. And they made no mention of proselytization in Japan. 
Far from it. Kume reported: "Even when we had audiences with emperors, kings, and queens, 
when we were entertained by foreign ministers, it was the words [commerce and industry] that 
always appeared in their speeches." The same feature had commended the Dutch, rather than 
the Spanish, to Ieyasu centuries before. 
    But of course sakoku was not in fact relaxed in the Temmei years. Instead Matsudaira 
Sadanobu intensified it. He also coopted scholars of the West while he discouraged the 
diffusion of their scholarship, and he persuaded his contemporaries and successors that 
Japan's intensified restrictions had their origins in the formative years of Tokugawa rule. 
   Today we are well aware that the openings provided in the sakoku system served Japan 
well in the nineteenth century transformation. From China and Chinese books came sure 
indications of the power of Western technology and the need to prepare measures to 
counteract it. Writings like Wei Yun's Hai-kuo tzu chih first alerted the government, which had 
immediate access to them through the censorship system, and then the literate, through 
Japanese editions that were immediately accessible to all who could read Chinese, that Japan 
was in danger. Meanwhile the Dutch imports of guns, and books about guns and technology, 
prepared many more for the need to restructure Japan's political economy to face the Western 
danger. 
    Indeed, Holland proved to have been an almost ideal bridge for the transmission of 
Western lore. Matsuki Koan was quite correct in saying that Holland was no longer the great 
power it had been in the seventeenth century, and that the Dutch did much of their reading in 
other European languages. But that same phenomenon meant that in importing their books in 
Dutch, Japanese had had access to the wisdom of all of the West. As a result, once a Japanese 
government reversed its policy from banning foreign travel, to virtually order a generation to 
study abroad, those students were prepared by training and some by language to speed their 
country's entry into the modern world.
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